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Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R.

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

GOOD MORNING,

COUNSEL.

3

THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR THE RULING IN THE

INSTANT

4

MATTER, SWEENEY LAND COMPANY VS. GILBERT AND MAUD KIMBALL,

5

ETC., CASE NO. 6211.

6

A DIFFICULT CASE BECAUSE OF THE (CONFLICTING NATURE OF THE

7

I

ISSUES INVOLVED, AND I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO
ALL COUNSEL FOR WHAT I DEEM TO HAVE BEEN A VERY PROFESSIONAL

8

COMPETENT PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

9

I HAVE NOW REVIEWED THE FILE, THE EXHIBITS,

10
u

LET ME FIRST SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN

I HEARD THE TESTIMONY, AND I AM PREPARED TO RULE
IN THIS CASE, THE PLAINTIFF FILED SUIT AUGUST

12

13

20TH OF 1980 SEEKING TO QUIET TITLE IN ITSELF FOR PROPERTY

14

ACQUIRED FROM UNITED PARK MINES COMPANY THROUGH JOHN J.

15

I

SWEENEY ON FEBRUARY THE 15TH OF 1980, SPECIFICALLY

16

|

ING THE CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS FLETCHER TO THE SO-CALLED

17

I

30-FOOT STRIP OF DISPUTED PROPERTY, AND THE CLAIMS OF
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL AND THE 30-FOOT

18

STRIP; DEFENDANTS FLETCHER AND PLAINTIFF BASICALLY HAVE

19

RESOLVED THEIR DISAGREEMENT BY INTERIM CONVEYANCES

20

PURSUANT

TO STIPULATION.

21
22

CHALLENG-

I

CONSEQUENTLY, DEFENDANTS FLETCHER MAKE NO SUB
STANTIVE CLAIM TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL.

DEFENDANTS

23
FLETCHER CLAIM INTEREST IN THE DISPUTED 30-FOOT STRIP BY
24
25

ADVERSE POSSESSION OF SAID PARCEL BY OPEN NOTORIOUS HOSTILE
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USE OF THE SAME CONTRARY TO THE INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANTS
KIMBALL, AND THE PLAINTIFF, FOR IN EXCESS OF THE REQUISITE
SEVEN YEARS REQUIRED AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY BY PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT AGAINST ALL OTHER PARTIES ON ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUNDS
FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF 20 YEARS.

DEFENDANTS FLETCHER

LIKEWISE CLAIM AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST AS CO-TENANTS
IN WHAT I SHOULD CALL THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL BY DEED
FROM ELIZABETH KIMBALL OF MAY THE 19TH, 1981, EXHIBIT 17,
SHE HAVING ACQUIRED THAT INTEREST IN THE SAME FROM HER
LATE HUSBAND, ROBERT KIMBALL.
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL CLAIM ON THE CONTRARY THAT THE
ORIGINAL CO-TENANCY BETWEEN ROBERT AND GILBERT KIMBALL WAS
TERMINATED EITHER BY DISCLAIMER AND/OR ADVERSE POSSESSION
AGAINST. ROBERT KIMBALL.

THEY LIKEWISE CLAIM TITLE TO THE

HERCIHISER PROPERTY AND 30-FOOT STRIP BY SURVEY AND

RESIST

THE CLAIM OF FLETCHER TO THE 30-FOOT STRIP BY CLAIMING
PERMISSIVE USE BY FLETCHERS AND/OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN
INTEREST, THE WORKMANS.
TITLE 78-12-7 ET SEQ. THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
STATES THE STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR CERTAIN PRESUMPTIONS THAT
ARISE IN ADVERSE POSSESSION CASES, SPECIFICALLY IF THE
PROPERTY IS HELD BY THE PARTY CLAIMING SUCH AN INTEREST AS
INTERPRETED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, AND SAID USE IS
CONTINUOUS, OPEN AND NOTORIOUS TO THE RECORT

' TLE OWNER'S

INTEREST FOR AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT
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OF THE SUIT, THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE ADVERSE USE PARTY
HAS LEGAL TITLE.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CLAIMS ARE ESSEN-

TIALLY THE SAME AS ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIMS EXCEPT THAT
THE PRESUMPTION ARISES IN FAVOR OF THE USER AFTER AT LEAST
20 YEARS ADVERSE USE.

ZOLLINGER

V.

FRANK, 172 P.2D 714,

1946 CASE, AND THE ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL CASE IN UTAH,
HARKNESS V. WOODMANSEE, 7 UTAH 227, THP EVIDENCE Itl I HI .
CASE HAS ESTABLISHED TO MY SATISFACTION BY A PREPONDERANCE
THAT THE FLETCHERS HAVE USED ADVERSELY, OPENLY AND NOTORIOUSLY THE DISPUTED 30-FOOT STRIP PARCEL AS AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL SUFFICIENT TO RAISE THE REQUISITE PRESUMPTION THEIR CLAIM IS A MATTER OF RIGHT EITHER UNDER THE
THEORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION OR PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.

IN

MY JUDGMENT DEFENDANTS KIMBALL HAVE FAILED, IN THIS COURT'S
VIEW, TO REBUT SAID PRESUMPTION BY FAILING TO CARRY THEIR
BURDEN TO ESTABLISH THAT SAID ADVERSE USE WAS PURELY PERMISSIVE.
IT IS THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS'
KIMBALLiRELIANCE ON THE DEEDS BETWEEN THEMSELVES OF 1977 ON
THE BASIS OF THE 1976 JONES SURVEY IS MISPLACED.
HIMSELF TESTIFII

-

MR. JONES

IS SURVEY WAS BASED IN LARGE PART

ON GILBERT KIMBALL'S INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT WERE THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY, WHICH I FIND TO BE IN ERROR.
ACCORDINGLY, TITLE IS QUIETED UN I III 30-FOOT STRIP IN THE
DEFENDANTS FLETCHER.

I FIND FOR SIMILAR REASONS THAT NO
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CLAIM TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE
PLAINTIFF.

TITLE TO THAT PARCEL IS QUIETED IN THE PLAINTIFF
AS TO THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL, IT IS THE LAW

IN UTAH THAT CO-TENANTS IN REALITY STAND IN A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP

OF

CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BY REASON OF THEIR

COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS.

THIS RELATIONSHIP MAKES IT PARTICU-

LARLY DIFFICULT FOR A PARTY TO CLAIM ADVERSE POSSESSION
AGAINST HIS CO-TENANT.

THE CO-TENANT'S INTEREST MUST BE

DISAVOWED BY THE ACTS OF THE MOST OPEN AND NOTORIOUS
CHARACTER^ WHICH SHOW CLEARLY TO THE WORLD THE CLAIMANT'S
INTENTION TO EXCLUDE THE RIGHTS OF THE CO-TENANTS.

THERE

IS A HIGHER STRICTER STANDARD OF NOTICE TO HIS CO-TENANT
COMMENSURATE WITH HIS

POSITION ' OF TRUST.. PAYMENT OF

TAXES BY ONE CO-TENANT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL, OR
BOTH IN THIS CASE, CO-TENANTS, CREATING A RIGHT OF REIMBURSE
MENT ONLY.

MCCREADY V. FREDERICKSEN, hi UTAH 388, AND

SEVERAL CASES SINCE AND UP TO AND INCLUDING THE CASE OF
OLWELL V. CLARK, 658 P.2D 585, 1982.

THE EVIDENCE, IN MY

JUDGMENT, HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CO-TENANCY
BETWEEN ROBERT AND GILBERT KIMBALL WAS TERMINATED.
ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANTS FLETCHER CLAIMING THROUGH ELIZABETH
KIMBALL DEED, EXHIBIT 17, ARE DECLARED TO BE CO-TENANTS WITH
MAUD KIMBALL IN THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL.
IT IS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT SAID PARCEL SHOULD
BE AND THEREFORE IS PARTITIONED.

THE NORTHERN ONE-HALF
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TO THE DEFENDANTS FLETCHER FREE; AND:CLEAR: OF ANY

"

CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS KIMBALL, AND THE SOUTHERN ONE-HALF
TO THE DEFENDANTS KIMBALL FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY CLAIM OF
THE DEFENDANTS FLETCHER.

DEFENDANT

KIMBALL IS TO BE

REIMBURSED FOR THE ONE-HALF OF THE TAXES PAID BY SHE AND
HER HUSBAND AS TENDERED TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT.

EACH

PARTY IN THIS CASE IS TO BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES
AS WELL AS COSTS.
MR. KINGHORN, WILL YOU PREPARE THE FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE, PURSUANT TO RULE /+?
MR. KINGHORN:

YES, YOUR HONOR, I WILL.

THE COURT:

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS, GENTLEMEN?

VERY WELL.

COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.

MR. FELTON:

THANK YOU.

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.)
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GERALD H. KINGHORN
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8644
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL
et al.,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Defendants.
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
Civil No. 6211
Crossclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY
FLETCHER, et al.,
Counter-Crossclaintants.
On the 5th day of September, 1985, at 9:00 a.m. the issues
raised in the pleadings between the parties came on regularly for
non-jury trial before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge,
at the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah.
The

Plaintiff

was

present

and

represented

by

counsel,

Edward S. Sweeney and Paul D. Veasy of Behle, Haslam and Hatch,
the defendant, counterclaimant and crossclairaant Maud Kimball was
present in person and by counsel, Robert M. Felton.

Defendants,

counterclaimants
and crossclaimants, Melvin and Peggy Fletcher
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were present in person and were represented by Gerald H. Kinghorn
of Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters.
Mr. Felton moved the Court for an order excluding witnesses
from the Courtroom until called to testify.

The motion was

granted and the Court asked that each witness proposed by the
parties, except the parties themselves, be sworn.

The Court then

admonished the witnesses to not discuss their testimony or the
testimony of others except with counsel.

The proposed witnesses

were then excluded from the Courtroom.
Counsel for each party made a short opening statement. After
the conclusion of the opening statements of counsel, Mr. Felton
moved the Court for an order granting a judgment of quiet title
to Maud Kimball for a portion of the property at issue generally
described as the "Hershiser* parcel. After hearing the arguments
of counsel, the Court denied the motion with leave to reconsider
after hearing the evidence.
The parties presented a written stipulation to the Court
signed by counsel fpr each party to permit the admission as
evidence of the exhibits named in the stipulation, reserving the
claims of the parties as to the relevance and/or materiality of
the exhibits.
ences

between

The stipulation is the result of pretrial confercounsel

for

the

parties

where

exhibits were disclosed, reviewed, investigated

the

stipulated

and corrected

where appropriate, to enable the parties to stipulate to the
admission of the exhibits without the necessity of individual
witness or document

foundation

for each exhibit.
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It is the

V-

understanding of the parties on the record that the plaintiffs
exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 5 are admitted for illustrative purposes
only*

The Court approved the stipulation of the parties and

received the exhibits in evidence.
The Plaintiff called and examined the following witnesses:
Randy Sorensen, Robert B. Jones,

Melvin H. Fletcher and Edward

S. Sweeney.
The Defendant Kimball then called and examined the following
witnesses:

Maud Kimball, Gary Kimball, Robert Ruggeri, Melvin

Fletcher; the deposition of Gilbert Kimball was considered as
evidence of the testimony of Gilbert Kimball.

The depositions of

Maud Kimball and Melvin Fletcher were published.
The Defendants Fletcher then called and examined the following witnesses:

Les Roach and Elizabeth W. Kimball.

Following the testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the
Defendants Fletcher, Defendant Kimball recalled Maud Kimball as a
rebuttal witness.
Each party
counsel

rested

and

a closing

for each of the parties.

statement

was made by

At the conclusion of the

closing statements of counsel, the Court recessed the trial at
5:30 p.m. on September 5th to be reconvened at 9:00 a.m. on
September 6, 1985 for further proceedings.
9:00

a.m.

trial was reconvened

and

On September 6 at

the Court

announced

its

decision in general terms and directed counsel for the Defendants
Fletcher to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Decree of Quiet Title based on the evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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u

c
Based upon

the

testimony

in open Court, the documents ,

surveys and affidavits entered into evidence, the candor and lack
of candorf demeanor of the witnesses and parties and the equities
in favor of or against each party apparent from the facts and
circumstances established by the evidence, the Court makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real property which is the subject of the claims of

the parties is located in Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park
City as recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Summit
County, Utah.
2.

Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park City as shown by

the records of the Summit County Recorder was platted as a block
of land without platting or dedication of interior streets or
further subdivision into lots.
3.

The Plaintiff and the Defendants Fletcher signed and

filed a stipulation dated May 31, 1984. Sweeney Land Company and
Melvin Fletcher and #Peggy Fletcher have performed the execution
and delivery of the deeds described in the stipulation.
4.

Based

on

the

pleadings

herein,

the

parties

claim

unencumbered fee simple title to certain parcels of land generally described as follows:
Sweeney Land Co. claims title to a parcel of land approximately 30 feet in width extending from the east street line of
Park Avenue in Park City as the westerly boundary, thence in a
northeasterly
direction
thirty
feet
approximately 164
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reubenwide
Clark Law for
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

received a deed from Elizabeth W. Kimball in 1983, which described the same land as claimed by Maud Kimball.
5*

For at least one hundred years prior to the filing of

the complaint herein, properties were generally conveyed in the
area of the subject properties without

accurate

surveyed or

dimension specific legal descriptions and under general statements as to the location and dimensions of the subject properties.

Under the circumstances, it is reasonable that the Court

interpret the legal descriptions contained in the various instruments upon which the parties claims are based in a manner consistent with the physical location of buildings and objects in
relation to each other, roads, improvements, dimensions described
in the instruments and the actual possession of the properties by
the parties and their predecessors in interest.
7.

The 30 foot strip claimed by the Plaintiff Sweeney was

conveyed to the Sweeney's predecessor, the United Park City Mines
Co., in 1953 by the Silver King Coalition Mines Company and Park
Utah Consolidated Mir^es Company by a deed which described the
property as a 30 foot strip of land which began at the easterly
side of Park Avenue and extended in a northerly direction for an
indefinite distance to a point generally stated as a right-of-way
granted under a specific deed dated November

13, 1883.

The

November 13, 1883 deed described in the conveyance to United Park
City Mines Co. is not of record and there is no evidence of the
terms or specific location of the right of way described in the
missing deed.DigitizedInby the1953
when the deed to United Park Mines was
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

executed and delivered, the scalehouse and warehouse described in
the legal description of the 30 foot strip were not in existence
and therefore the northeasterly boundary of the 30 foot strip
could not be identified.
8.

In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball purchased

from Summit County certain interests in land in the area of the
Hershiser-Kimball parcel*

The area had been purchased in 1928 by

Robert W. Kimball, the father of Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert
Kimball.

Robert W. Kimball conveyed the property to Robert T,

Kimball.

Robert and Gilbert thereafter deeded the property in a

mortgage-deed transaction as security for a loan.

Taxes on the

property were not paid and the property ultimately was purchased
by Summit County
Gilbert

Kimball

for taxes.
purchased

In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and

the

Hershiser-Kimball

parcel

from

Summit County under a general legal description which did not
completely and accurately describe the dimensions of the area
Summit County intended to convey and the Kimballs intended to
purchase.

,

Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball were brothers and
business partners in the Kimball service station and garage.

In

1976, the Defendant Kimball commissioned a survey by Robert Jones
of the property owned pursuant to the deed from Summit County
executed and delivered in 1940 to Gilbert Kimball and Robert T.
Kimball.

The 1976 Jones survey accurately depicts the property

intended to be conveyed to the Kimball brothers.in 1940 by Summit
County.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9.

The plaintiff received a quitclaim deed from United

Park City Mines . in 1980 containing a land description which
partially

overlaps

the

property

claimed

by

the

Defendants

Fletcher and Kimball; the Plaintiffs were on notice by virtue of
the recordation of the deed by the Defendant Kimball of the
overlap and the actual occupation and historic use of the area by
Fletcher that title to the 30 foot strip was disputed.

The

Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used aind occupied no
more than the north 15 feet of the 30 foot stripf for a distance
of 99 feet extending from the easterly right of way line of Park
Avenue.
10.
and

Portions of the property claimed by Sweeney Land Co.

Kimball

have

been

used

and

occupied

by

the

Defendants

Fletcher for a period in excess of 20 years openly and notoriously.

The use of the Hershiser-Kimball property by the Defendants

Fletcher and the Fletchers predecessor in interest was not under
any agreement or permission from any person or entity.

There is

no credible evidence, that the Fletchers use was not adverse to
Kimballs and all others and therefore the use by Fletchers was
and is adverse to the Kimballs.

The area used and occupied

openly, notoriously, adversely, and exclusively by the Defendants
Fletcher is generally described as that area lying North of a
line beginning at the Southeast corner of the land conveyed to
Melvin H. Fletcher by his predecessor in interest and proceeding
therefrom at a bearing of North 61° 10' East across the Kimball
property to the gravel road depicted on the exhibits a distance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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+*

>w

of approximately 71 ft. with the exception of a small stucco
building located on the property which has been used by the
Defendant Kimball since approximately 1940.

No portion of the

property described by the Kimball counterclaim has been occupied
by the Kimballs with the exception of the stucco building indicated on the Exhibits within the last forty years.
The Defendants Fletcher occupied the area of the 30 foot
strip claimed by the Defendants Kimball for a period in excess of
20 years and used the area for commercially valuable purposes
including ingress and egress to their property, for parking of
vehicles, for garage purposes and for the storage of household
materials, garden utensils, hunting equipment and other miscellaneous, personal property.
11.

The Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest paid

property taxes for an area which was indefinite and therefore the
Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that the
Plaintiff paid property taxes on the entire 30 foot strip as
claimed in the complaint.

The payment of property taxes by the

Plaintiff was consistent with the claims of the other parties and
the legal description in the deed tor United Park City Mines in
1953.
12.

The Kimballs

paid

property

taxes

from

1977 to the

present on the entire parcel described in the survey of property
by Robert B. Jones.
13.

Based on the testimony of Maud Kimball and the rele-

vant deed language Gilbert J. Kimball and Maud Kimball intended
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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V

to create a joint tenancy interest between themselves by the
execution and recordation of the deeds.

Gilbert Kimball died

prior to the trial of the matter and his joint tenant Maud
Kimball survived him.
14.

There is no evidence that Gilbert J. Kimball, Maud

Kimball or any party on their behalf ever provided notice of any
kind to Robert W. Kimball or his successors to the effect that
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball intended to adversely possess
the Kimball parcel as against Robert W. Kimball; there is no
instrument or other evidence of the conveyance of the co-tenant
interest of Robert W. Kimball to Gilbert Kimball or Maud Kimball
or conveyance of the interest of Robert W. Kimball to any party
other

than by operation

Wilkins Kimball.

of

In 1976,

law

to Robert's heir, Elizabeth

(the date of death of Robert W.

Kimball) Robert Kimball had not received notice of any act of
adverse possession or executed
Kimball
interest

parcel;
in

the

Robert

any

Kimball

instrument

possessed

Her.shiser-Kimball

parcel

an
as

to convey the
undivided
more

50%

correctly

described in the Robert B. Jones survey which is of record.
15.

Since 1942 Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball have paid

the property taxes on the Hershiser-Kimball parcel including the
taxes due November 30, 1983 in the total amount of $4,641.66.
The

record

shows

that

on

or

about

February

15, 1984, the

Fletchers tendered the sum of $2,320.83 to the Defendant Kimball
by check to the Clerk of the Court where the funds tendered are
on

deposit.

The

Defendants

Fletcher

are

indebted
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to

the

L,
Defendant Kimball for one half of the amount of all property
taxes paid by the Defendant Kimball which is the sum of $2,320.83
not including taxes for the years 1984 and 1985. The Defendants
Fletcher owe an amount equal to one half of the property taxes
for 1984 and 1985 to Maud Kimball.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The claim of each party must be sustainable on its own

merits.

Each claim should be evaluated based on a root of title

or title by adverse possession where appropriate.

The terms of

the stipulation are reasonable and the stipulation should be
approved and recognized by the Court and where otherwise appropriate made a part of the Decree of Quiet Title herein.
2.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of.quiet title as

its sole property to a strip of land north of the centerline of
the 30 foot strip for a distance of 99.03 feet from the east
right-of-way line*of P^rk Avenue
Snyders Addition to Park City.

as

platted

in

the

plat

of

The Plaintiff may be entitled to

a decree quieting title in the Plaintiff to a 50% undivided
«

interest with Maud Kimball in the Hershiser parcel deeded to the
Plaintiff by Defendants Fletcher together with a 50% undivided
interest in the 15 feet North of the centerline of the 30 foot
strip

deeded

to

the

Plaintiff

by

the

Defendants

Fletcher.

Because the pleadings of the Plaintiffs do not state a claim for
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
Clark Law School,
BYU. partition of
quiet title as
a co-tenant
with
MaudJ. Reuben
Kimball
or for
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•w

W

the co-tenant interests the decree herein should not define an
interest other than the interest of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder.
3*

The Defendants Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher are

the successors-in-interest to the co-tenant interest of Robert W.
Kimball as conveyed to them by his heir Elizabeth W. Kimball.

It

is reasonable that the interests of the co-tenants be partitioned
in a manner consistent with the reasonable use of the property by
each co-tenant and in a manner which will preserve the economic
value for each party in a roughly equal manner.
quiet

title

should

partition

the

The decree of

Hershiser-Kimball

parcel

to

quiet title in Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher to the portion
of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel described as follows:
Beginning at a point North 23°38t West
85*97 feet and North 33°26f West 46.70 feet
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, Amended
plat of Park City in Section 16 Township 2
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and South 61 o 10' West, 73.16 feet
and North 28° 50" West 55.7 feet to the true
point of beginning;
Thence'along the following courses and
distances: North 28°50f West along the East
boundary of the land conveyed to Melvin
Fletcher by Mary Workman a. distance of 60.6
feet, thence North 61*10' East 61.93 feet,
thence South 43 p 13f East 15 feet, thence
South 33°25f East 47.6 feet more or less,
thence South 61 o 10 f West 70 feet more or less
to the true point of beginning.
4.
of

the

The area of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel which is South
Fletcher

partition

parcel

described

above

should

be

partitioned to Maud Kimball as her sole and separate property.
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Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball were joint tenants in the 50%
undivided

interest purchased by Gilbert

in 1940 and

therefore

upon Gilbert's death any interest of Gilbert terminated and Maud
became

the

sole

owner

of

Hershiser-Kimball parcel.

the

50% undivided

interest

in

the

A decree of quiet title should issue

to Maud Kimball as follows:
Beginning at a point North 23° 38f West
85.97 feet and North 33° 261 West 46.7 feet
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, amended
plat of Park City, Utah in Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 61° 10f West
73.16 feet, thence North 28° 50 f West 55.7
feet, thence North 61° 10' East, 70 feet more
or less, thence South 33° 25f East, 58 feet
more or less to the point of beginning.
Maud Kimball should also be decreed a 50% undivided interest
as a co-tenant with Sweeney Land Company as the owner of a 50%
undivided

interest in the Hershiser parcel as described in the

exhibits and to the balance of the land north of the extended
center

line of the 30 foot

parcel of

land

quieted

strip

to Melvin

immediately
Fletcher

and

adjacent
Peggy

to the
Fletcher

above.
5.

It is reasonable that each party bear its own attorneys

fees and costs and therefore no award of attorneys fees or costs
should be made to any party against the other.
DATED this

day of October, 1985.
BY THE COURT
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District Judge

GERALD H. KINGHORN
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8644
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

)
)

VS.

GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL
et al.,
Defendants.
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
AND TO ALTER OR AMEND
THE JUDGMENT

)
Civil No. 6211

Crc»ssclaim Plaintiffs,

)

vs.
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY
FLETCHER,, et al.,
Counter-Crossclaimants.

)
)
)

The motion of the Defendant Kimball and the Plaintiff for a
new trial or in the alternative to alter or amend the judgment
came on regularly for hearing on December 2, 1985 at 10:00 a.m.
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge at the District
Courtroom, Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah.

Counsel

for the Defendant Kimball, Robert Felton, Counsel for the Plaintiff Sweeney Land Company, Paul Veasy and Counsel for Melvin and
Peggy Fletcher, Gerald H. Kinghorn were present.
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The Court heard the arguments for and in opposition to the
motions, and upon being fully advised it is hereby ordered that
each motion be and the same hereby are denied,
DATED this

day of January, 1986.
BY THE COURT

J. Dennis Frederick
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOP NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR
AMEND THE JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following
on this -2 day of January, 1986.
Robert Felton
5 Triad Center, Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Paul Veasy
50 West Broadway
4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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Robert Felton, 1056
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City', Utah 84180
Phone:
(801) 359-9216
Attorney for Defendants
and Crossclaim Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

SWEENEY LAND

COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 6211
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

GILBERT ana MAUD KIMBALL, et ai
Defendants.

GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
Crossclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY
FLETCHER, et al.,
Counterclaim-Crossclaimants.
* * * * * * * * *

Robert
Memorandum

Felton,

attorney

for

Kimballs,

hereby

submits

in support of his Motion for a New Trial filed

above-entitled

this

in the

action.

JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS SIGNED BY THE COURT
FAIL TO REPRESENT THE COURT'S RULING

Kimballs,
Court

by

and

through

their

that a new trial be granted

Findings

attorney,

for and on the ground

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain disarray
errors.
Judgment
are in
such
and

and

hereby

move

this

that the

contrary

to the

ruling

of

this

trial.

The Judgment and Findings which were* submitted by counsel

for Fletchers
submitted

Court

do not

that

that

substantial

reflect

counsel's

justice

demands

the ruling of this Court

alteration

of the ruling

a

and

new

it is

is, in and of

itself, persuasive evidence of the error in this Court's ruling.
On Page 3 of this Memorandum
delineate

the

action.

property

The

property

in

top

are two diagrams which roughly

addressed

diagram

accordance

after

describes

with

the

the

the

trial

in

distribution

Recorder's

transcript

this

of

the

of

the

Court's ruling dated September 6, 1985.
The

lower

diagram

describes

the

property

distribution

as

reflected by the Judgment and Findings executed by the Court.

"B"

As can be clearly

seen, the distribution of Parcels

on

diagram

the' attached

differ

significantly

"A" and

from

the

conclusion at trial and that reflected in the written Judgment.
In addition
written

to

Judgment,

the

differences

of

the

counsel

stated

that

Parcel,

and

title

in that

leave

to

they

made

counsel
parcel

reconsider

no

for

claim
Kimballs

to them.
it

Sweeny

after

to

and

Parcel
moved

"A",

for

an

The Court denied
hearing

the

property

the

At the commencement

for

the

and

fatally flawed as to require a new trial.
counsel

of

Ruling

so

both

distribution

the

is

trial

either

between

for
the

Fletchers
Hersheiser

Order

quieting

the Motion with

evidence

(Findings

of

Fact Pg. 2 ) .
In the Judgment of the Court the parcel of property
neither
one

Sweeney

to which

nor Fletcher claimed any interest was awarded in

caseDigitized
100%
to Sweeneys and in the other
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case

(written

RULING FROM THE BENCH
A - Sweeney 100%
B - Fletcher 100%
C - Fletcher 100%
D - Fletcher 100%
E - Kimball 100%

tr:-'J
A - Hersheiser Parcel
C - 30' Strip
E - Kimball Parcel

WRITTEN JUDGMENT
A - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50%
B - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50%
C - Fletcher 100%
D - Fletcher 100%
E - Kimball 100%

W

}\»\Lj J
)r>

Uf.
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Judgment)
was

divided

there

no

50%

to Sweeney

evidence

submitted

and
by

50% to Kimball*
Sweeney

as

to

Not

only

ownership

of

this parcel of property, they expressly never claimed an interest
in it yet the ruling awards it to them anyway.
The written judgment awards the northern half of the 30 foot
strip designated
50%

on the diagram as Parcel "B" 50% to Sweeneys and

to Kimballs, yet Kimballs' claim to the entire 30 foot strip
M

(Parcels

C" and

"B") is exactly

the same.

There is no evidence

nor justification to somehow delineate Parcels "B" and "C" and it
is

submitted

that

if Kimball

maintain

a 50% interest

in Parcel

"B" then they should also have a 50% interest in Parcel "C".

THE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG BURDEN OF PROOF AND LAW
AND SAID APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
The

ruling

Fletchers,

of

the

by a preponderance

strip

adversely

least

as

to

against

the main

co-tenant

as

set

from

the

bench

set

of the evidence, used

Kimballs*

parcel

the Kimballs have failed
a

Court

In

the

of property,

next

paragraph,

the Court

states

at

that

to satisfy their burden of proof against

forth

in

Olwell

v.

Clark

658

The claim which Fletchers assert

to Parcels

(the

foot

strip)

of

with

Kimballs.

tenancy

that

the 30 foot

(1982).
30

forth

arises

directly

That

out

co-tenancy

their

P.2d

"B" and

claim

cannot

be

of

585
M

C"

co-

terminated

unless it meets the higher standards set forth in Olwell supra.
The
described
"D"

and

Notice

of

the entire
"E")

Probate

Distribution

parcel of

demonstrating

a

property
clear

filed

by

(Parcels

position
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Mr.

"A",
that

Kinghom
"B", "C" t

Fletchers 1

\

interest
the

was claimed

Strieker

standard

relationship
Fact

to be as a co-tenant
against

in distributing

(Paragraph

8)

also

and the ruling applies

Kimball

while

ignoring

the other parcels.

asserts

that

the

the

The Findings of

entire

parcel

is

the

property deeded to Kimballs in 1940.
These
earlier

facts

considered

demonstrate

that

the

has been applied so randomly

in

conjunction

ruling

is

with

those

so .confused

and

cited

the

law

that a new trial is the only logical

way to straighten out the ownership of this property and place it
in the proper hands.

THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW REGARDING
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTIVE
In
only

its

ruling

difference

easement

was

the

Fletchers
acquire
U.C.A.

paid

title

right

Court's

time

title

taxes

by

each

stated

and

a

to

vest

took

that

the

prescriptive
(excluding

This misapprehension of the law of this State

to

the written
no

Court

ruling

stated

that

(even

though

that

is no dispute

that

the 30 foot strip

judgment).

on

adverse

The Court's

the

There

property

possession

as

and,
set

therefore,

forth

cannot

in § 78-12-12

(1953).

Since
only

of

this

possession

in the ruling.

received
in

bench,

adverse

length

is a major error

is changed

the

between

payment of taxes).

Fletchers

from

EASEMENT

there
which

ruling

Fletchers,

can

it

be no adverse

can

be acquired

quieted
did

not

title
grant

in
them

possession
is

one

the
an

by

30

in Fletchers, the
prescription.

foot

easement
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strip

across

to
it.

The
the
The

Court

has,

pursuant

very

simply,

confused

the

acquisition

of

title

to the adverse possession statute with the right of use

as against

the

use.

Court

The

fee

title holder acquired

has

granted

fee

title

by continuous

years of

in

which

Fletchers

is

impossible under the Doctrine of Prescription.
It is further
the

30

foot

submitted

parcel

Fletchers

which

requirements

of

can

conceivably

be

to

prescriptive

easement

(excluding

the issue of co-tenancy) was for a driveway

accessing

rear

of

evidence

his

house.

clearly

feet wide.

the

the only evidence as to use of

construed

the

meet

by

that

The

delineates

evidence

and

the alleged

plat

submitted

driveway

as being

The easement, if any, cannot be expanded

into
eight

by Order of

this Court and must be confined to its historical existence.
Kimballs
supported

that

the

finding

of

an

easement

is

not

by the evidence but, if the Court sustains itself, that

the easement
because

submit

can only be eight feet wide and used for a driveway

that

is

the

size

and

use

established

historically.

McBride v. McBride 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978).

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S VERDICT
Counsel

for

application
Court.
was

of

Kimballs

the

At the hearing

stated

that

the

submitted

by

the

t^at

the

the

Court

fact>

ruling

facts

of

counsel

admits
and

some

the

confusion

conclusions

drawn

in
by

the
the

before this Court on November 4, 1985, it

Court

would

execute

for Fletchers.
written
and

is

in

written

This was

Judgment
not

the

done

significantly

conformance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

documents

in spite

of

alters

the

therewith.

The

evidence as a whole does not support the Court's ruling either
from

the bench

or

the written

form.

A different

standard of

proof was applied in the termination of the co-tenancy

between

Kimball and Fletcher as to Kimballs1 interest but was not applied
to Fletchers' interest.
when

only

an easement

Fee title was granted to a 30 foot strip
was proven

and

the distribution

of the

property is not supported by the evidence.
The Court's'ruling fails to address the easement claimed by
Kimballs over the 30 foot strip.

If Fletchers have an easement

to the 30 foot strip north of the Kimball parcel then the issue
of the prescriptive use of the remaining parcel up to Park Avenue
must

be addressed.

findings
tenants.

and

This

allegation

is

especially

true in light

that

Fletchers

and

Kimballs

of the
are

co-

If they are co-tenants then Kimballs should also have

such an easement.

CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that this is a complicated case involving
a lot oi different descriptions and uses of property over a great
number of years.

The

resolution

of the dispute, however, has

been further complicated by three significant factors;
1.

The written Judgment and Findings significantly changes

the property

distribution

that

the Court

made

at

the

time of

trial,
2.

The burden of proof and standard of care as between co-

tenant has been misapplied, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

The Court has misapprehended

the applicable law as to

quiet title actions and adverse use.
It is submitted
fact

that

That

fact

stands
is

to this Court

out

at

that

the

that there is one apparent

conclusion

everyone,

of

including

these proceedings*
the

Court,

appears

confused•
It is respectfully

submitted

that the only way

to unwind

this web of confiision and at the same time do substantial justice
to all parties

is to grant a new trial where the parties can

present their proof and clarify

the confusion which has arisen

from these initial proceedings.
This is a very valuable piece of property located next to a
ski lift in Park City and the parties deserve a resolution which
is,

to the best of everyone's ability, fair and in accordance

with the applicable law.

It is submitted that the situation as

it exists now does not rise to that standard.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ ^/

day of Novepte/, 1985.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

certify

that

foregoing MEMORANDUM

I mailed

a

true and

correct

copy

of the

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO

AMEND JUDGMENT postage prepaid, to Paul Veasey, 50 West Broadway,
4th

Floor,

Salt

Exchange . Place,
this

Lake
Suite

City,
1000,

Utah
Salt

84101,
Lake

Gerald
City,

y^5^day of September, 1985 .
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EXHIBIT "A"
•i

'

'•ft'

To Whom It Nay Concern!
!f Marion li. Fletcher, el; SiaH Lake City, Utah, do
; herel'i'i lee Lara that I am the son of Roy Fletcher, formerly a
resident of Park City, Utah.

This document relates to property

•• of Roy Fletcher'known as the Park Avenue property.
During the lifetime'of my father, I had discussions
with him regarding this Park Avenue property and the use by him
of the adjacent Kimball property.

The 3 egal description and-a

torial survey of the Kimball property is displayed on the
page attached hereto.

My father acknowledged the ownership of

the Kimball property by Gilbert John Kimball and Maude S. Kimball, his wife, having stated that his use of the roadways and
buildings and his use of the Kimball property was by peieiiaaion
of Gilbert

J Kimball under a revokable agreement my father had

worked out with him.

The above recitation has also always been

my understanding of the matter.
*

- I t was my fat .tier's understanding that at any time
Gilbert J, Kimball would request, the improvements placed on
the Kimball property would be subject to removal by ray father
without compensation, and use of the Kimball property discontinued*
Dated this

JL (&

day of

:
<U^<*

h^^f

LRION G. FLETCHER
Signed and delivered
in the presence
of:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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y SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE
1, Robert B. Jones. Salt lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that I an * rtglst
%r*A land Surveyor and that 1 hold License No. 1525, as prescribed by the laws of
the State of Utah, and 1 have made a survey of the following described property:
Beginning at a point .North 23° 3U' 'Jest 85.97 feetAfrom the Southeast corner
of Block 7, /tended Plat of Park City in Section 16, Township 2 South, Rift* 4 East
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 61° 10' West 73.16 fttti thenc
North 20* 50' West 123.59 feet; thence North 61° 10* East 33.90 feet; thence North
28* 50* West 30.00 feet; thence North 64° I T East 17.00 feet; thence South 43* 13*
£a*t 56.5Q feet; thence South 33' 25" East 103.30 feet to the point of beginning.
I further certify that the above plat correctly shows the true d1aens10HS
Of the property surveyed and of the vUible improvements located therton and their
position on the said property; and further that none of the visible Improvements oi
the above described premises encroach upon adjoining properties and that no v1s1bl(
Digitized by the Howard
W. or
Hunter
Law of
Library,
J. Reubenproperties
Clark Law School,
BYU. upon the above desImprovements,
fences
eaves
adjoining
encroach
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
cribed property,
except as shown.
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78-12-2

JUDICIAL CODE

limitation period, as affected by statutes
defining commencement of action, or expressly relating to interruption of running
of limitations, 27 A. L. R. 2d 236.
Validity and construction of war enactments in United States suspending operation of statute of limitations, 137 A. L. R.
1440, 140 A. L. R. 1518.
Validity of contractual time period,
shorter than statute of limitations, for
bringing action, 6 A. L. R. 3d 1197.
Validity of statute enlarging limitation
period, 79 A. L. R. 2d 1080.
War as suspending running of limitations in absence of specific statutory provision to that effect, 149 A. L. R. 1457,
150 A. L. R. 1420, 151 A. L. R. 1456, 152
A. L. R. 1452, 153 A. L. R. 1422, 154 A. L.
R. 1448, 155 A. L. R. 1452, 156 A. L. R.
1450, 157 A. L. R. 1450, 158 A. L. R. 1450.
What statute of limitations applies to
action for contribution against joint tortfeasor, 57 A. L. R. 3d 927.

What statute of limitations applies to
action for surplus of proceeds, from sale
of collateral, 59 A. L. R. 3d 1205.
What statute of limitations covers action for indemnity, 57 A. L. R. 3d 927.
What statute of limitations governs action for interference with contract or other
economic relations, 58 A. L. R. 3d 1027.
When statute of limitations commences
to run against action based on fraud in
construction, repair, or equipment of
building, 150 A. L. R. 778.
When statute of limitations commences
to run against promise to pay debt "when
able," "when convenient" or the like, 28
A. L. R. 2d 786.
Withdrawal of foreign corporation from
state as tolling statute of limitations as
to action against corporation, 133 A. L. R.
774.

ARTICLE 1
REAL PROPERTY
Actions by the state.
Section 78-12-2.
Actions by patentees or grantees from state.
78-12-3.
When letters patent are declared void.
78-12-4.
Seizure or possession within seven years necessary.
78-12-5.
78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso—Tax title.
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title—Limitations of action or defense—Proviso.
78-12-5.3. Definition of " t a x title" [and "action"—Separability].
Actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate.
78-12-6.
Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner.
78-12-7.
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession—Presumption—Proviso—Tax title.
Under written instrument or judgment.
78-12-8.
78-12-9.
W h a t constitutes adverse possession under written instrument.
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment.
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument.
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.
78-12-12.1 . Possession and payment of taxes—Proviso—Tax title.
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.
78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord.
78-12-15. Possession not affected by descent cast.
78-12-16. Action to redeem mortgage of real property.
78-12-17. When more than one mortgagor.
78-12-18. Actions to recover estate sold by guardian.
78-12-19. Actions to recover estate sold by executor or administrator.
78-12-20. Minority or disability prevents running of period.
78-12-21. Disabilities enumerated—Time of not reckoned.

78-12-2. Actions by the state.—The state will not sue any person for
or in respect to any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by
reason of the right or title of the state to the same, unless:
(1) Such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before
any action or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
(2) The state or those from whom it claims shall have received the
rents and profits of such real property, or some part thereof, within
seven years.
176
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-2.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-2 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
School land.
Board of education may lose by adverse
possession title to property that is not

78-12-5

used for school purposes, but is held for
sale as business property. Pioneer Tnv. &
Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt
Lake City, 35 U. 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am.
St. Rep. 1016.
Collateral References.
'Limitation of Actions<@=»ll(l).
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 15.
51 Am. J u r . 2d 661, 888, Limitation of
Actions §§ 84, 416.

78-12-3. Actions by patentees or grantees from state.—No action can
be brought for or in respect to real property by any person claiming
under letters patent or a grant from this state, unless the same might
have been commenced by the state as herein specified, in case such patent
had not been issued or grant made.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-3.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-3 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Patentees.
The statute of limitations begins to
run against the patentee of public lands
from the United States from date of

issuance of the patent, and not from
date of final payment for the land. Steele
v. Boley, 7 U. 64, 24 P. 755, following
Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239, 33 L. Ed.
327, 10 S. Ct. 83, and overruling Steele v.
Boley, 6 U. 308, 22 P. 311.
Collateral References.
Public Lands<§=>114, 181.
73 C.J.S. Public Lands § 246.
63 Am. J u r . 2d 594, Public Lands § 125.

78-12-4. When letters patent or declared void.—When letters patent
or grants of real property issued or made by the state are declared void
by the determination of a competent court, an action for the recovery
of the property so conveyed may be brought either by the state, or by
any subsequent patentee or grantee of the property, his heirs or assigns,
within seven years after such determination, but not after that period.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-4.
Compiler's Notes.
. _
mi
This section is identical to former section 104-2-4 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

Collateral References.
P u b i i c Lands<&=>119, 121, 122, 181.
£3 C.J.S Public Lands § 255^
63 Am. Jur. 2d 561 et seq., Public Lands
c 93 e ^ s e q

78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years necessary.—No action
for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within
seven years before the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-5.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is similar to section 1042-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed by
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 104-2-5
was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1;

that provision is compiled as 78-12-5.1
herein. The Supreme Court held the
amendment was valid despite the repeal
of section 104-2-5.
Cross-References.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS
I t was not error to dismiss complaint in
action to quiet title, where the evidence
clearly showed a continuous open, hostile
and adverse possession by defendant and
his predecessors in interest for a period
of more than seven years before appellant commenced her action. Bozievich v.
Slechta, 109 U. 373, 166 P. 2d 239.
I t is well settled in this state that a
person holding property under a defective tax title for a period of seven years
is doing so adversely to the claim of ownership to such property by the delinquent
tax debtor owner. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los
Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 119 U. 169, 225
P. 2d 722.
Plaintiff acquired title by adverse possession where it enclosed land with fence,
built improvements, created artificial lake,
paid taxes, grazed land and conducted
commercial enterprise thereon for seven
consecutive years and defendant never attempted to assert possession. Falconaero
Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Inv. Co., 16 U.
(2d) 77, 395 P . 2d 915.
Waiver or loss of right to plead statute.
Where husband commenced action to
have property which was held in wife's
name regarded as being held in trust
for him, while wife's divorce proceeding
was pending against him, and spouses entered into agreement t h a t if husband

78-12-5.1

would dismiss his suit to recover property wife would dismiss her action for
divorce, and in pursuance of this agreement, husband dismissed his suit but wife
prosecuted her action to final decree, her
conduct constituted palpable fraud and her
plea of statute of limitation could not
prevail in subsequent suit by husband. Anderson v. Cercone, 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586.
Collateral Eeferences.
Limitation of Actions < §= 3 19(l).
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 34
et seq.
51 Am. J u r . 2d 661 et seq., Limitation of
Actions § 84 et seq.
Commencement of running of statute of
limitations respecting actions by owners
of right of re-entry, or actions against
third persons by reversioners, 19 A. L. R.
729, 144 A. L. R. 1383.
Statute of limitations applicable to action for encroachment, 24 A. L. R. 2d 903.
When does cause of action accrue, for
purposes of statute of limitations, against
action based upon encroachment of building or other structure upon land of another, 12 A. L. R. 3d 1265.
When statute of limitations or laches
commences to run against action to set
aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer in
fraud of creditors, 100 A. L. R. 2d 1094.

DECISIONS U N D E R FORMER LAW
Action by minor.
Action by minor within two years after
he had attained majority, to recover real
estate, was not barred although administrator was not discharged, since rule t h a t
heirs are barred where administrator is
barred was inapplicable, property being
distributed to minor under 75-12-8 (since
repealed). Robbins v. Duggins, 61 U. 542,
216 P. 232.

Amendment ineffective.
I n action to quiet title against party
claiming adversely under t a x deed from
county, held that 1943 amendment to
former 104-2-5 was ineffective and did not
reduce time within which plaintiff might
bring such action from seven to four
years, in view of the fact t h a t former
104-2-5.10 had been declared unconstitutional. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los Angeles &
S. L. R. Co., 119 U. 169, 225 P . 2d 722.

78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso—Tax title.
—No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof
shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or
possessed of such property within seven years from the commencement of
such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses
brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or
determine the ownership of real property against the holder of a tax title
to such property, no such action or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance,
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied or
been in possession of such property within four years prior to the com-

179

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78-12-6

JUDICIAL CODE

Definition of "Action."
The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims
and cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is
sought.
Invalidity in Part.
If any section or part of section of this act shall be held invalid, it
shall not invalidate the remaining porti ons of this act.
History: C. 1943, 104-2-5.11, enacted by
L. 1951, ch. 19, § 3.
Construction.
Failure of county auditor to attach his
affidavit to county assessment roll did not
void auditor's tax deed to county since
term " t a x title," as defined by this section,

would indicate that legislature intended to
include within statutes of limitation tnx
titles which were initiated by tax sales
the records of which would not show that
each statutory step had been followed with
exactitude. Layton v. Holt, 22 U. (2d)
138, 449 P. 2d 986.

78-12-6. Actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate.—No
cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an action, founded upon
the title to real property or to rents or profits out of the same, shall
be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, or
interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the action
is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the property
in question within seven years before the committing of the act in respect
to which such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-6.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-6 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-References.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
"Actions."
Procedure to collect special improvement
taxes as provided in city ordinance was
held not to be an "action" within meaning
of this section. Petterson v. Ogden City,
111 U. 125, 176 P . 2d 599.
Adjoining landowners.
Title by adverse possession cannot be
claimed in the face of an agreement between ndjoining landowners. Warren v.
Mazzuchi, 45 U. 612, 148 P. 360.
In dispute between adjoining landowners
respecting water rights, where no rights
are either established or lost by course of
conduct in particular case, statute of limitations does not apply. Campbell v. Nunn,
78 U. 316, 2 P. 2d 899.
Adverse right to water.
To acquire an adverse right to the use

of water, there must be seven years'
continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, adverse enjoyment, under claim of
title, with knowledge and acquiescence of
the person having the prior right. Accordingly, no such title can be acquired in
excess of the amount awarded by the
court's decree. Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Richmond Irr. Co., 80 U. 105, 13 P. 2d
320, following Spring Creek Irr. Co. v.
Zollinger, 58 U. 90, 197 P . 737.
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to private
rights of way or to any other class of
easement by prescription. Harkness v.
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291.
Any person who claims title to, or an
interest in, or lien upon, any real estate
may invoke aid of statute of limitations
as against claimant whose claim is prior
in time to person invoking aid of statute,
when prior claim has been barred by
statute of limitations. Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 U. 165, 104 P . 117, 26 L. R. A. (N.
S,) 898.
This section governs an action for compensation for taking of land by public
service company without plaintiff's consent and without condemnation. Salt Lake
Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 46
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS
Cross-References.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq.
Payment of taxes.
Redemption from a t a x sale does not
constitute a payment of taxes, and a t a x
title claimant who failed to show a payment of taxes even though in possession
for more than seven years could not quiet
title as against the record title holders.
Lyman v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7
U. (2d) 123, 320 P . 2 d 322.
The holders of a t a x title could not
quiet title as against the record title hold-

78-12-8

ers, who had been out of possession, even
though the t a x title claimants had been
in possession for more than seven years
and had paid taxes or redeemed the property from taxes during the period. Lyman
v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 TJ. (2d)
123, 320 P . 2d 322.
Collateral References.
Adverse Possession<§=a87.
2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 277.
3 Am. Jur. 2d 346, Adverse Possession
§ 249.
Void tax deed, t a x sale certificate, and
the like, as constituting color of title,
38 A. L. R. 2d 986.

78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment.—Whenever it appears
that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession
of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding
such claim upon a written .instrument as being a conveyance of the
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent
court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of
the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some
part of the property under such claim, f ^ H^YfTi yQfly<?j thp property 5°
included is deemed to have been held adversely, except that when the
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession
of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-8.
'
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-8 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-References,
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Commencement of running of statute.
In action for possession of land, s t a t u t e
of limitations does not begin to run until
true owner's right of possession has been
so invaded as to give rise to cause of
action so t h a t where true owner's right to
possession of land had not been so disturbed or encroached upon, s t a t u t e did not
begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 U. (2d)
303, 422 P . 2d 525.
Contract to purchase.
Contract to purchase is not a w r i t t e n
instrument under which color of title can
be based in order to gain title within seven
years pursuant to this section. Memmott
v. Bosh, 520 P . 2d 1342.
Cotenants.
This statute does not run between eoten-

ants unless and until there is manifested
a determination on the p a r t of one in
possession to exclude the other cotenants.
Memmott v. Bosh, 520 P . 2d 1342.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by
adverse possession, set out in former sections 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were held
to be exclusive. J e n k i n s v. Morgan, 113
U. 534, 196 P . 2d 871.
Minors.
Seven-year period for adverse possession
began to run upon delivery of the so-called
guardian's deed executed after the wards
attained their majority. Memmott v. Bosh,
520 P . 2d 1342.
"Open" and "continuous" possession.
Evidence held to show t h a t possession
of lot by defendant as y a r d in connection with his blacksmith shop was of
continuous and open character required
by statute for title by possession under
color of title. Bingham Livery & Transfer Co. v. McDonald, 37 U. 457, 110 P . 56.
Where defendant, in possession of lot
used as y a r d in connection with his
blacksmith shop, permitted teamsters, peddlers, and others who had occasion to do
so to use i t as campground when such
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-9

verse possession under color of title where
he has deprived himself or been deprived
of the color relied on, 136 A. L. R. 1349.
Tacking adverse possession of area not
within description of deed or contract, 17
A. L. R. 2d 1128.
What informalities, irregularities or defects in respect to execution of a tax
deed prevent running of statute of limitations or period of adverse possession, 113
A. L. R. 1343.
Writing as essential to color of title in
adverse occupant of land, 2 A. L. R. 1457.

Forged deed or bond for title as constituting color of title, 68 A. L. R. 2d 452.
Grantor's possession as adverse possession against grantee, 39 A. L. It. 2d 353.
Judgment or decree as constituting color
of title, 71 A. L. R. 2d 404.
Necessity of actual possession to give
title by adverse possession under invalid
tax title, 22 A. L. R. 550.
Possession by stranger claiming under
conveyance by cotenant as adverse to
other cotenants, 32 A. L. R. 2d 1214.
Scope and application of the doctrine
that one cannot successfully claim ad-

78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument.
—For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or
decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following
cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) Where it lias been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of
fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage
or for the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-9.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-9 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-Beferences.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to private
rights of way or to any other class of
easement by prescription. I t can only be
applied by analogy. Where a person opens
a way for the use of his own premises,
and another person uses it also without
causing damage, the presumption is, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that
such use by the latter was permissive, and
not under claim of right. Harkness v.
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291.
Evidence of adverse possession.
Where plaintiffs asserted title by written instrument and adverse possession,
evidence that plaintiffs and their prede-

cessors had paid all taxes for over thirty
years and that the property had been
occupied by the plaintiffs, their predecessors, or tenants for commercial purposes
for a like period established hostile and
adverse use for a period beyond the statutory requirement. Michael v. Salt Lake
Inc. Co., 9 U. (2d) 370, 345 P. 2d 200.
Evidence that plaintiffs in an action
to quiet title had the tract in question
inclosed, along with a larger tract, by an
electrified barbed wire fence, placed stables and other improvements thereon, pastured horses there, and paid all taxes
for a period of seven years in accordance
with 78-12-12, all the while being in
exclusive and uninterrupted possession of
the tract, clearly established good title by
adverse possession. Falconaero Enterprise,
Inc. v. Bowers, 16 U. (2d) 202, 398 P. 2d
206.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by
adverse possession, set out in former sections 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were held
to be exclusive. Jenkins v. Morgan, 113
U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871.
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS
wlien it was suitable only for placer mining, where another subsequently and surreptitiously located and filed placer claim
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac.
Co., 67 U. 590, 248 P. 819.
Defendants failed to establish occupation or possession of certain land within
limits of requirements of this section,
where only evidence of possession consisted of use by defendants of t h a t land
for grazing of their cattle, which use
was not exclusive inasmuch as third person used the land for same purpose to
knowledge of defendants without intervention or complaint on their part. J e n k i n s
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871.
Repairs and improvements made by cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and fences were insufficient to put
other cotenants on notice that cotenants
in possession were claiming title adversely
to them, since such acts were normally
consistent with tenancy in common and
not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542.
Maintenance of a fence, payment of
taxes, and other evidence of possession
and occupation for over twenty years
were sufficient to establish ownership as
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 6 U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513.
Collateral References.
Adverse Possession<§=»19-21.
2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et seq.

78-12-12

3 Am. Jur. 2d 97 et seq., Adverse Possession § 19 et seq.
Acquisition by user or prescription of
right of way over uninclosed land, 46 A. L.
R. 2d 1140.
Adverse possession based on encroachment of building or other structure, 2 A.
L. R. 3d 1005.
Adverse possession involving ignorance
or mistake as to boundaries—modern
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171.
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R.
1373.
Adverse possession of railroad right of
way, 50 A. L. R. 303.
Cutting of timber as adverse possession,
170 A. L. R. 887.
Crazing of livestock or gathering of natural crop as fulfilling traditional elements
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818.
Possession by widow after extinguishment of dower as adverse to heirs or their
privies, 75 A. L. R. 147.
Reputation as to ownership or claim as
admissible on question of adverse possession, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770.
Use by public as affecting acquisition by
individual of right of way by prescription,
111 A. L. R. 221.
Use of property by public as affecting
acquisition of title by adverse possession,
56 A. L. R. 3d 1182.

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case
shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of
any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-12.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section
104-2-12 was amended by Laws 1951, ch.
19, § 1 ; t h a t provision is compiled as 7812-12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held
the amendment was valid despite the repeal of section 104-2-12.
Cross-References.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq.
Acquisition of title in general.
Where claimant under claim of owner-

ship went into actual possession of certain
lots which had been sold to county for
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter
fenced lots and commenced to improve
them, subsequently receiving deed from
county, held possession was adverse, from
time of entry, as to all the world except
county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 U. 185, 120
P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175.
Open, notorious and hostile use and possession of the property and payment of
taxes thereon, all under claim of right,
will constitute adverse possession. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160.
Where defendant and his predecessors
had been in actual, open, and adverse
possession of land for statutory period,
and for seven successive years had paid
taxes thereon, and they were inclosed,
occupied, and cultivated, title was ae-
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lako County Utah

Robert H . Ruggeri, Esq.
Attorney f o r E x e c u t r i x
O f f i c e and Post Office Address:
5 9 East C e n t e r S t r e e t
Box 3 1 0 , M o a b , U t a h 84532
801-259-5611

FEB 111976

IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T ,
IN AND FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF UTAH

In the M a t t e r of the Estate of
ROBERT W . K I M B A L L ,
a l s o known as
ROBERT K I M B A L L ,
a l s o known as
R O B T . W . K I M B A L L , and
being one and the s a m e p e r s o n ,

P R O B A T E N O . 62327

Deceased.

DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION
E L I Z A B E T H W . K I M B A L L , E x e c u t r i x of the Estate of R o b e r t W . K i m b a l l ,
a l s o known as R o b e r t K i m b a l l , also known as Robt. W . K i m b a l l , and being one and
the same p e r s o n , and hereinafter for aonvenience r e f e r r e d to as Robert W . K i m b a l l ,

jg^^^W
deceased, having on the

££

day c?*slSs&»yy A . D . , 1976, filed In this C o u r t h e r

P e t i t i o n , setting f o r t h , among other t h i n g s , that a l l accounts in said Estate have
been paid and f i n a l l y settled; that said Estate Is now In a condition to be closed; that
a portion of said Estate r e m a i n s to be distributed and Petitioner prays t h e r e i n that
the residue and the whole of said Estate be distributed to Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l ,
the person entitled to r e c e i v e the e n t i r e and whole of said E s t a t e , and said m a t t e r
coming on r e g u l a r l y to be heard this

/ /

day oC2a$Liary, A . D . , 1976, this

C o u r t proceeds t o the hearing of said P e t i t i o n .
It appearing to the satisfaction of this C o u r t that the C l e r k duly fixed the
t i m e and place f o r the hearing of said Petition and gave due notice thereof as r e quired by law; that a l l Accounts have been f u l l y settled; that a l l taxes against the
p r o p e r t y of said Estate have been paid; that there is no inheritance tax due and
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-2owlng f r o m the said Estate to the State of U t a h , nor to the United States of
A m e r i c a ; that the residue of said E s t a t e , and the whole thereof, consisting of
the r e a l and personal p r o p e r t y hereinafter p a r t i c u l a r l y described and r e f e r r e d
to,

I s now r e a d y for d i s t r i b u t i o n .
And I t f u r t h e r appearing to the C o u r t that Robert W . K i m b a l l , deceased,

died testate on the 20th day of M a r c h , A . D . , 1975 a t S a l t L a k e C i t y , S a l t L a k e
County, State of Utah; that said deceased at the t i m e of his death was a resident
of S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah; that said deceased left surviving h i m as his sole legatee
and devisee under his L a s t W i l l and T e s t a m e n t , his w i f e , Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l ,
now residing a t 2283 G a r f i e l d Avenue, S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 8 .
And it f u r t h e r appearing to the Court that the said Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l
I s now the owner of the whole of said estate and Is e n t i t l e d , t h e r e f o r e , to have
the e n t i r e residue and the whole of said estate distributed to h e r .
N o w , on this //

day £j£^e$uary,

A

«

D

* > 1976, on motion of Robert H .

R u g g e r l , A t t o r n e y f o r said E x e c u t r i x , and no objection being made t h e r e t o , and
t h e r e being no objection on f i l e ,
IT IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D , ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
T h a t the residue and the whole of the Estate of R o b e r t W . K i m b a l l ,
deceased, h e r e i n a f t e r p a r t i c u l a r l y described and set forth and now remaining
In the hands of said E x e c u t r i x , together with any and a l l other p r o p e r t y which m a y
belong to said E s t a t e , whether herein p a r t i c u l a r l y mentioned or not, or in which
said Estate m a y have any I n t e r e s t , b e , and the same I s , hereby distributed to
Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l , now residing a t 2283 G a r f i e l d A v e n u e , S a l t L a k e C i t y ,
Utah 84108.
T h e following Is a p a r t i c u l a r description of said residue of said Estate
r e f e r r e d to in this D e c r e e and of which distribution is o r d e r e d , adjudged and
d e c r e e d , as a f o r e s a i d , t o - w t t :

_

~

-
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-3REAL PROPERTY:
A l l of L o t 4 1 , Bonneville Garden Second A d d i t i o n , according to the
official plat thereof in S a l t L a k e County, State of Utah
PERSONAL PROPERTY:
1966 C h e v r o l e t 4 door automobile bearing S e r i a l N o . 27063

<\

/

'-.'

Savings Account 701 1011819 In the amount of $ 7 , 3 9 9 . 0 7 w i t h
' ';
P r u d e n t i a l F e d e r a l Savings and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n , S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h . <
Savings C e r t i f i c a t e N o . 1787 w i t h Prudential F e d e r a l Savings and Loan
S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah 701-0178712 $ 7 , 8 7 8 . 1 9
2 0 0 shares of S i l v e r King M i n i n g Company
70 s h a r e s of A m e r i c a n Mutual Building and Loan Company
2 6 7 s h a r e s of A m e r i c a n Savings & Loan Association
5100 s h a r e s of Tenabo Consolidated M i n e s Company
100 shares of T r a p p e r s P r i c e M i n i n g Company
1330 s h a r e s T i n t l c Coalition M i n e s Company
1000 s h a r e s of Howell Mining Company
5 0 0 s h a r e s of Combined M e t a l s , Incorporated
2 0 0 s h a r e s Intermountain P e t r o l e u m Company
4000 s h a r e s Flagas,taff Bonanza M i n i n g C o .
5 0 0 s h a r e s T h r e e Kings Consolidated M i n i n g C o .
3000 s h a r e s Spring V a l l e y M i n i n g Company
1000 s h a r e s T u m a Corporation of N e v a d a .
Dated t h i s

//

day c4£#ft^ary, A . D . ,

/'

Sfc%*>^|

I

1976.

ATTEST

w. sncnuKo EVANS
ci&ix

..*•-.
r '*

/

*y -J^ir

V ^ ; ^ ^

JUDGE

STATE OF UTAH

u

&&%vmm,

. JEfff'U'l ftW¥

COUNTY OF SALT LAKT );^>\) % * [ * ' ; /f
\^,,,
I, THE UNOERSIGNEJJ.SDUf^ OF- THE'PISTniwjv)
COURT OF SALT L A K E ^ ^ T Y / U r A l ^ n t t ' H F ^ & Y ^
CERTIFY THAT THf A t t ^ X E * " m? FCfcC#fyNG 1$ \ ;
A TRUE ANO FULL'C^tf.' Of^M 6rti£.KiAL $6Q&>
f
MENT ON FILE IN WYvQ#ICEja.S s B c ^ d , © * ! * <• V i - J '
WITNESS MY HAtyty^&AC*Oiypk\0
CQUR^?
THIS
DAY OF, J _
H. Oi
OLEY.
6t,i
EY.dSJ*-^^
S+ ~ '}
BY

fr

^Jfe/ynt^^^^^
• '''^J-^fr* /•
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+>•&

, Entry No.

\

V

REQUEST OF

Recorded return to:
H. Kinghorn
* ^change Pi. #1000
^L.C. , Utah 84111

-;&-

£&&f)<

<?&£ W1

FEE

ALAN SPRIGGSL SUMMIT CO. RECORDER-

$,, ft 47i.

- By

RECORDED

NOTICE OP PROBATE
DISTRIBUTION

\A<S/lfi«

tL

at

^-V^

M

SPACE ABOVE FOR
RECORDERS USE
INDEXhU:

GRAKTOR: ..„„t>.-^"l

&RAm&

LEASED:

Property a f f e c t e d :

r^*_

S

_£^

'

-A-Tr-t.l

ABSTRACTED: ft <-'' AT? .

STAMPED:
(^
Beginning at a point North 23°38' West 85.97 feet
and North 33°25' West 46.70 feet from the Southeast
• ,...
Corner of Block 7, Amended Plat of Park City in
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Sglt Lake
Base and Meridian and running thence South 61 10
West 73.16 feet: thence North 28°50' West 128.59 feet;
thence North 61 0 10' East 33.90 feet; thgnce North
28 50' West 30.00 feet; thence North 64 11' East
17.00 feet; thence South 43°13' East 56.50 feet;
Thence South 33°25' East 103.30 feet to the point
Recorded herewith
as Exhibit 1 is the Decree of Distribution
of beginning.
in the Matter of the Estate of Roberjt-Kimball, deceased, Probate
# &£!>*-•%
In The District Court fofSs}lt Lake £ounty, Utah.
ii

;

™? &-

"

•>•''•• ,#«Tttfe'*v25thT day of May personally appeared before me
,»t j[}G4w^ d fh* K i n ^* l o r n w n o d u l acknowleged to me that he executed
't*h£f, foregoing Notice.
< '''

Si "

*

*'* or v -^% >

' •> i

v.,.,My*^fc omm. expires:

if^r^lf

(& ^ ^

Residing in S.L.C. Utah
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND,FOR SALT LAK£ COUNTY, STATE OF

UTAH

* * * * *

In the Matter of the Estate of :
ROBERT W. KIMBALL,
also known as
:
ROBERT KIMBALL,
also known as
:
ROBT. W. KIMBALL
and being one and the same
:
person,

' !!

/:PROBATE NO. 62327

Deceased.
•

.

'.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of January,
1984, in the above-entitled court^at Salt Lake City, Utah,
commencing at the hour of

9:00 a.m., the above-entitled

matter came on for hearing before the Honorable

Scott Daniels

sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings
were had.

"t^>^
l5l98*
00-itXV

fEB

l ! U

^CH>rt

'#*?**
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(January 18,

:

1984

THE COURT:

A

,

9:15

A.M.

We'll return, then, to the estate of Robert

W. Kimball, petition of Maud and Gilbert Kimball for
reappointment of Elizabeth W. Kimball

as personal

representative of the estate.
MR. FELTON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

The factual basis for this request today arises or
is centered about a piece of property located in Park City
in what is known as the sever of the Depot project right
in the middle of Park City.

There is a Quiet Title

action

which is currently in progress in Summit County and originally
involved the people who owned the old Coalition Building,
the Sweeney family which burned down a couple of years ago.
Mr. Kinghorn's clients, who own or he owns a house
on Park Avenue, adjacent to that property, and my clients,
who own a parcel of property between three quarters and
an acre behind that,

they are all three located together

in Park City.

<

f

:

This case has been pending for a couple of years,

I

believe, though I'm not specific, early in 1983.
It was discovered on Mr. Kinghorn that Gilbert Kimball,
my client's deceased brother's name,appeared on an old
Sheriff's Deed, 1976, I believe.

Anyway, it was something

new that popped up, and it appears in the Record Title.
After that Mr. Kinghorn's client, Mr. Fletcher, went
to the decedent's widow, that is, Elizabeth Kimball, who we
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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wish to have reappointed
and OCR,
requested
a deed.

•

Now, nothing

was paid for this Deed,

But approximately

May of 1983 Elizabeth Kimball executed a Deed to these
Third Parties.
THE COURT:
MR. FELTON:
THE COURT:
MR. FELTON:

Quit claim, right?
Pardon me?
A Quit

Claim Deed?

A Quit. Claim Deed as a person, not

as a personal representative or anything else, individually
to the Fletchers for this piece of property.
So at that point, then, we have the gaps and that.
We get to this point, Your Honor, and we believe it is proper
at this point that the Estate be reopened under the •
statutory authority of 75-3-108-- I'm sorry, 1008, and believe
this is particularly the situation<contemplated by that
statute for subsequent administration.

*

There are some facts, I believe, are undisputed,
Your Honor, and that is, number one, prior to the circumstances]
surrounding the execution of this Deed, Elizabeth Kimball
never knew about whatever interest she had in this property.
It was newly discovered, and I don't think that's

disputed.

There is a second fact, and that is that my clients
have treated this property as their own for a number of
years, and they dispute the validity of any interest which
passed to the beneficiary, Elizabeth Kimball, or subsequently
to Mr. Kinghorn's client

through the Quit Claim Deed.

Third, there is no personal representative's Deed,
nor other instrument showing the disposition of this property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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out of the Estate, nor is there real property either in the

inventory, nor the final Deed of distribution.in the Estate
of Robert Kimball, and in fact, was newly discovered property.
Now, it may have passed under the residuary clause, true, but
nobody knew about it, and it's not addressed. Those, I think,
are undisputed./

•••'*. /

. . ...,

i- t

.„ ;. .-.-.., i.

We have a new piece of property recently discovered.
There is, and I will address early some —

my adversaries

here state that we are probably not interested parties
and I would address the Court to 75-1-201(20).

That definition

is cited in both the briefs submitted by Mr. Ruggeri and
Mr. Kinghorn regarding who is an interested party such that
they may file the petition for subsequent administration under
3-1008.

And the interested is defined

more.than just creditor]

as a creditor or other very broad language having a property
right in or claim against the Estate.

And we certainly

assert such a claim as to both the fact that we have ownership
of a property which has now been purportedly passed through
the Estate to a Third- Party

as well as maybe some other

claims for that action; namely, the Deed.
One other thing regarding the closing of the Estate
of Robert Kimball and that needs to be addressed, and that is
I will refresh Your Honor's memory, that the new Tax Reform.
Act went into effect January 1, 1977.

This Estate was closed

almost nine months prior to that time, prior to January 1, 197^
The total State Tax exemption was $60,000.
they had the unified credit.

It is before

And there may well be Estate

taxes due, if this piece of property is included in the Estate
And I'm uncertain
because quite honestly Mr. Ruggeri's
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Mrs. Kimball won't say it, and we have to determine
the interest of the estate is here.
.

And it's a necessary

To bring a necessary * party, we have to have a

rial representative.

It's as simple as that.

I haven't filed a complaint and stuff because I don't]
anybody to sue yet, and that's all we're requesting.
think it can all be done in Summit County, but we need
sr party, and to get that party into court, I can't
30 serve her.

I have to have her reappointed and

Lish her position, and that's our request.
THE COURT:

Mr. Ruggeri.

MR. RUGGERI:

I would like to simply

offer one

:ime that I enter an appearance on behalf of Elizabeth
LI in the District Court in Summit County and enter
iimer of any interest coming to her since she is the only
1, the only litigee , the only devisee
i entire estate.

is entitled to

And all we want to do is stop litigating,

expensive to come up here all the way from Moab.

She's -4

it, my uncle Gibb are partners., We are talking about -an unfortunate thing.

It's causing trouble with me and

isins who I dearly love.

And I don't want to have to do

tis.
What we want is out.

We'll enter a disclaimer.

' could complain about that if they are sincere about it
e she was the only person under the terms of that will
as entitled to receive anything.
And then I also say that if the Court has any
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UBlB^ka iS 111
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

SWEENEY LAND COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
MELVIN FLETCHER and
1 PEGGY FLETCHER,

)
)
)

1

vs.
|

Defendants.
_____)
! GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
)

Civil No. 6211

Crossclaim Plaintiffs, j
VS.
*

1

•

MELVIN FLETCHER and
PEGGY FLETCHER,

)
)

Crossclaim Defendants. )
Deposition of:

GILBERT KIMBALL

January 28, 1983

•

Reported by:

Lillian S. Hunsaker

From the Reporting Offices of:

Capitol Reporters
P. O. Box 1477, Salt Uke City, Utah 84110
(SOD 363-7939

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

A

Lynn and Lawrence Kimball.

Q

And were those your father's brothers?

A

They were my father's brothers. They were partners

•

in the livery business.
Q

When did the livery business close down?

A

In 1928—'27 or '28, when I built the garage.

MRS. KIMBALL:

'27.

Q

(By Mr. Felton)

And you said you built the garage?

A

Yes. That's the Kimball Art Center now.

I built

it as a garage in 1929, but had a service station on i t —
Q

Let me ask the questions, now.
You say you built a garage there in 1929?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you build it or were you in business with

somebody else?
A
building.

I had it built b y —

Sidney Mulcock put up the

Slack Winbern was the architect.

Q

How do you spell his name?

A

I doft't know.

Q

What kind of a garage was this?

A

It was a storage garage and repair, gas and

service station and garage.
Q

Mr. Kimball, let me show you what has been marked

Exhibit 2 and could you tell me where your garage was?
A

The garage is here.
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Q

When you say "here"—

A

On the corner of Park Avenue and Heber Avenue.

Q

Would you put a Number "1" where that garage is

with this pen?

. > . • *•.' .*••«••

A

(Witness complies.)

Q

And put a circle around it.

A

Yes.

Q

Is that where it says "Eley Motor Company"?

A

Yes.

Q

And that was in 1929?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And how long—

A

The livery barn was on this property.

Q

Now, put a Number

A

(Witness complies.)

Q

And how long did you operate the garage?

A

I operated the service station there from 1926

M fl

2

there and circle that.

until it went out of business in 194 0.
Q

And then after the service station went out of

business, what happened to the building?
A

It sold t o —

Well, it eventually was sold to Eley

Motor Company.
Q

Did you sell it?

A

No, I lost it.

Joe Rozzelle foreclosed on the

property.
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Q

When was that?

A

That was 1940.

Q

All right.

u«,

Now, on Number 2, where the livery stable was?
A

That was also included in the foreclosure. When

Mulcock or when Joe Rozzelle took over the property, he took
over Number 1 and Number 2.
Q

All right.
Now, let me show you—

A

Number 3 is this property here.

Q

Now, on this Exhibit 2, it has "Gilbert and Maud

Kimball" on the exhibit. What is that piece of property?
A

T h a t ' s the property back of Eley Motor or back

of Kimball Art Center.

I t i s bounded by the Union Pacific

Railroad and F l e t c h e r ' s property and Kimball Art Center and
the S i l v e r King p r o p e r t y .
Q

Did your father ever own that property?

A

My father bought the property in 1924.

Q

From whom?

A

From the Kimball Investment Company.

Q

Did you ever get a deed from Summit County for

Ed Kimball.

that property?
A

Y e s .

.-..:.-•• >

Q

Let me show you Exhibit 9 and ask you if that is a

copy of the
deed from Summit County.
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A

Uh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) .

T h a t ' s t h e Quitclaim Deed

from t h e County.
Q

Why did Summit County g i v e you t h a t ?

A

Back t a x e s .

Q

Did you own the property before that?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you have trouble paying the taxes?

A

I let it go for taxes, yes.

MR. FELTON:

Off the record.

(Recess.)
Q

(By Mr. Felton)

,.
Gib, I showed you the wrong deed.

Excuse me.
Instead of Exhibit 9, Exhibit 8 is that deed from
Summit County.
A

Yes.

Q

I didn't look at it very carefully.
That's the deed from Summit County?

A

Yes.

Q

And you were back on taxes and then redeemed the

property?
A

Yes.

Q

Nov/, Gib, what I would like you to do a little bit,

could you tell me back when your father operated the livery
stable or afterwards, did you ever have any business on any
of this property?
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A

On this property?

Q

Any of it.

A

Yes.

Q

You have talked about that your father had the

livery stable on what's marked as Number 2?*
A

Yes-.

Q

And that you had the garage on what is marked

Exhibit Number 1?
A

Yes.

Q

And those two parcels were foreclosed in 194 0?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Did you ever use any of the other property on

Exhibit

2?

->

A

I used this property.

Q

That is Number 3?

A

Number 3.

i •-•

I moved the little stucco building from the corner
of Park Avenue and Heber Avenue.
Q

That's from the corner of Number 1?

A

Number 1.

I moved the building from Number 1 to

Number 3 in 1929.
Q

Now, would you put Number "4" on this piece of

property.
A

Back here (indicating) I built a —

Q

Let me use this as Number 4.

. ;<

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
CAPITOL REPORTERS,
P. O. BOX 1477,
SALT
LAKE
CITY,
UTAH 84110, (801) 363-7939

;

A

Okay.

Q

Now, you moved a building onto Number 3?

A

I moved a building on Number 3, yes. And then I

installed a.gas pump, a pump station on Number 4 back here
on the corner to pump gasoline from the railroad up to a big
tank that I had here. .
Q

..,-.-.••,

Where the pump station is, I'm going to put a

Number "A."
9
10
11
12
13

A

All right.

Q

Is that right?

A

About there, yes.

Q

And when did you install that pump station?

A

I installed that in 1928 or '29. It was right

Where you drew?

,,

>

' ,

after we built the garage.
Q

And you said you pumped gas from this station?

A

I bought gasoline in carloads from Park Co.,

Wyoming, and I pumped that gas into a big storage tank that
was up here on this property.

n.

to

19
20
21
22

Q

Would you draw in where the storage tajik is. , 4.t.

A

Well, I had a storage tank in here.

0

Can you put a number about in there?

A

(Witness complies.)
I had a tank in here (indicating) right alongside

23

the garage.
Q

?

,• ,

Can I trace those lines right here and put a
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Number "B" in here?
A

Yes.

Q

And you pumped gas from "A" to

s

fl

B.H

Did you pump it through the line?
A

We had a gas line, three-inch pipe line.

Q

Would you draw in approximately where the gas was.

A

The pipe line runs from this pump station up to

this.
Q

And I111 trace over that line you have just drawn,

but going between Number "A" and "B"; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And I've written on there "pipe line."

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

How was the gas delivered?

* A

That was about a two-inch pipe line.

It was delivered by railroad.

Q

And where did the railroad come in?

A

The railroad come in over the Silver King tracks.

Q

Can you draw a line where the railroad came in?

A

It was in here, down to the terminal building and

they bring the railroad cars in here.
Q

Could you put the terminal building in?

Where is

the terminal building?
A

Down here on the Silver King property.

Q

Can we mark that as Number "C"?

Is that what you

have drawn in?
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A

Okay.

Q

Is that what used to be called the Coalition

Building?
A

Yes.

Q

The one that burned down recently?

... A

5

. Yes.
i

Q
^ . A

And then I will mark "railroad tracks"—
The railroad came right up to our property line

here.
, »..,, Q

I'm going to designate what you have drawn in as

the railroad tracks as "D" and write railroad tracks underneath
is that right?

\ .v

A

That's right.

Q

Did you have any storage facility at the pump

station?
A

Is there anything to store gas in?
Just the pump house here where we kept our tools

for hooking u p —

Just an electric pump.

Q

Were there any underground tanks or anything there?

A

No.

The only tank we had was this big tank up

here.
Q

And the service station closed in 194 0, you said?

A

Yes,

Q

And then what happened to the pump station?

A

Well, it abandoned.

It left. Cement footing is

still in there.
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Q

When you say "in there," you mean Number "A"?

A

Yes. There is a big cement block there that was

a foundation for the gas pump.

,,::

Q

How about the pipe line?

A

No.

Did you ever remove that?

Some of it was removed when the Kimball Art

Center built a parking lot here.
Q

When you say "here," you mean on part of the

property between Number 2 and 3?
A

Yes, on Number 2. The Kimball Art Center have

that little parking lot now, and they took up part of that
line.
Q

When we have to read this later, we have to identify|

what you're talking about.

So what you're talking about is

where the parking lot is just east of the Number 7?

This is

north?
A

Yes.

Q

Just east of Number 7 on Exhibit 2?

A

That would be right.

Q

But did you remove any of this pipe line?

A

No.

Q

Do you know if it's there now?

A

Some of it's still in there, I'm sure.

Q

There is on Exhibit Number 2 what looks like

somebody's drawn in a property line here.

It is "south 61

degrees"--! can't read the rest of it—"33 minutes" and it
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runs—looks like from Park Avenue up to the corner where you
had the pump station, Number 8?
A

That's right,

,

. ,

Q

Now, was there ever, to your knowledge, any fences

in that area?
A

Ever a what?

Q

Fences.

A

Yes, The Silver King Company or the coal company,

I guess it w a s —

i •>

Hopkins Coal Company had a big board fence

along there,
Q

This is the line you have described?

A

Yes, Along the north line of the Fletcher property

and along the Silver King property, there was a fence, a
board fence, so people wouldn't get in there to steal the
coal.
Q

If I understand your description right, there was

a board fence running from Park Avenue along the north property!
line of Fletcher's property to the corner, the Number 8?
A

Yes.

Q

And then running in a northerly direction.

A

Then it run north to the corner.

Q

Can I call that Number 5?

A

Yes,

Q

Did it end there?

A

1 think the fence ended there.

It may have come out
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here to this property line, I don't know.
Q

When was that fence there?

A

The fence was there all during the Silver King's

operation.
Q

And when was that?

A

I think they stopped in 1956.

Q

Do you know what happened to the fence after 1956?

[•> \;j: A

I think the King, when they surveyed their property,

I think they tore the fence down.
c_- Q

i vi

\ ;t

Did you see anybody take the fence down?

A

No.

Q

You don't know—

A

I don't know who did it.

Q

Have you personally looked at this property on

Number 4 and Number 3?

M-

A

Yes.

Q

Many times?

. A
Q

Have you been out there?

Yes.
Have you ever seen anything that looked like a

survey marker around Number 4?
A

Yes. The. Silver King—

Q

Let me ask you another question.

Don't tell me

about the Silver King survey.
When did you see anything that looked like a survey
marker?
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A

When I had it surveyed, it was railroad^

Q

When was that?

A

In L97 6.

Q

Did you see anything before that?

A

There were markers before that.

Q

What kind of markers?

A

They were pipe with a copper head or a brass head.

A pipe marker.
• - Q

Can you tell me approximately the first time you

ever saw them?
i'

A

It would be in the 197 0's, or may have been back as

far as 1960— '61.
Q

Can you tell me, thenf they were pipe with what

on them?
A

Pipe markers with brass caps.

Q

Can you tell me where they were?

A

They were—

There was one located here and one

here.
Q

When you say "here," show me where.

A

Well, how can I tell you?

Q

You tell me and I will put a black dot there.-

A

Yes, one there.

Q

And I'm going to put a Number 6 here and circle

it with an arrow to the little black dot.
Is that what you identified?
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A

All right. And there was another one here.

Q

And that's next to the Number 5?

A

Next to the Number 5.

i.c .!ZJ Q ,

All right.

A

And there was another one here.

Q

That is on the corner next to Number A?

A

Number A.

vki-.,;;..

,,,

It seemed to me there was another one--

There is

one over here on Park Avenue.
Q

Right here about, and I'll put a dot and put the

Number 7 by it.
A

There was a pipe marker there.
It seemed to me there was another marker in here.

.,;

Q

When you say "in here," you're going to have to

just point with your pen.
A

Down in here somewhere.

Q

Okay.

I'll put the next dot and the Number 8 in

there somewhere.
A

I haven't been able to find that marker recently,

but I'm sure there was one there that I saw before.
That's all grown up v/ith weeds and trees in there
now.

It covers up some of those markers.
Q

How did you get to your pump station?

A

How?

Q

When you used it.
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1 ;

A

Oh, went down this road,

2

Q

This road, you mean?

3

Vw

4

Utah Central Railroad right-of-way.

5
6

-i A

Down what they call Pacific Avenue now.

Q
;

7L

It was the

And that's how you got to the pump station?

A

Yes.

Q

Gib, was there ever any driveways or any paths

8 I through there?
i

i , .:

9I

A

10

Q

When we say "through here," let me identify it.

11

A

It paralleled that fence.

12
13

There was a driveway through here.

There was a road come

through there.
Q

And I'm going to mark on Number 9 "road;" is that

14 what you're talking about?
15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Okay.

17

Ai

That road was used by the coal haulers. They used

lg

to bring the coal in on the Silver King tracks.

19

Q

That is Number "D"?

20

A

Yes.

21

They would bring coal cars in on the same tracks

22

that they brought my gas in on. And then the coal haulers

23

would load the coal out of the coal cars and they would load

24

it down this road and take it down to the coal scales to be

25

weighed.
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20

Q

When did that stop?

A

It stopped about the time people stopped using

coal*

That would be when they changed from coal to gas

furnaces.

Most everybody changed.

'* L: i.... .• -

When was it, Maud?

1956.
Q

All right.

A

A lot of people used oil.

Stopped using coal and

burned oil for several years before they put in the gas •.:
furnaces.
•A r Q

Mr. Kimball, do you claim that you have been paying

taxes on this Number 348?

It's actually Parcel Number 4 and

it's identified on this as ffSA-348."

-i

A

Yes,

Q

Have you been paying taxes on that?

A

I have been paying taxes on that.

Q

Do you know how long?

;

.iA

As long as I can remember.

It would go back into

1956.
-' • Q

Let me show you Exhibit Number 10. Do you know

what that is?
;*:•;• i A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Tax receipt.

Q

It's a tax description, isn't it?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And the number on it is "SA-348"?
Digitized P.
byO.
theBOX
Howard
W.SALT
Hunter
LawCITY,
Library,
J. Reuben
CAPITOL REPORTERS,
W77,
LAKE
UTAH
8 4 U 0 ,Clark
(801)Law
3 6 School,
3 7 9 3 9 BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A

That's right.

Q

Now, Gib, did you go over and talk to anyone at

the County about this property, Number 4?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

. »<

Q

When did you go over?

.

A

I don't remember the date.

Q

That was the first time?

A

Yes.

Q

Who did you talk to?

A

To Wanda Spriggs.

Q

And who was she?

A

She was the County Recorder.

In 1956 or about that

time.
.-;;,, .;

t

.

:

I asked her to show

me a plat of our property.
Q

Did she show you one?

A

She showed me the plat and it included this

property.

.»,•...»••;,•:••

Q

Number 4 ?

A

Number 4.

Q

Was that in 1956 or later?

A

It's about 1956.
But it didn't describe this property.

We didn't

have a proper description on our tax return—our tax notice.
So I asked her how to get a property description on our tax
notice.
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A
' :-:" Q

Yes. That would be the deed.
Gib, has anyone, as far as Parcel Number 4,

this piece of property, Number 4 on Exhibit Number 2 —

Has

anybody ever claimed besides Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher, Melvin
Fletcher, has any other person or company ever told you they
owned it?
A

No.

Q

Now, are there any buildings on piece Number 3 or

Number 4 now?
A
property.

Nobody's ever told me that they ever owned that
Fletcher never claimed to own it.

Q

Are there any buildings on Number 3 or 4?

A

Yes.

Q

Let me show you Exhibit Number 1.

A

Yes.

Q

Does that show the buildings?

A

It shows this little stucco building that I had

/

moved from Park Avenue.
Q

Now, I have to do this, because I may have to

explain this to someone else.
You're talking about what is identified as a
^stucco" building?
A

Yes. And that was moved from Park Avenue and

Heber Avenue to this point. And there is a garage here that
Ezra Workman-CAPITOL REPORTERS, P. 0 . BOX 1477, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110, (801) 3 6 3 7 9 3 9
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~3

Q

Can I mark that on Exhibit Number 1 as "A"?

That's

the garage you said?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And it's shown as a frame shed?

A

Yes, it's a wood shed.

Q

And there's one on there that Mr. Fletcher built?

A

Yes.

Q

And that's Number "B"?

A

Yes.

Q

Which Mr. Fletcher?

A

Roy Fletcher, Melvin's father. Then there is a

little coal house.
Q

That's Number "c"?

A

That was Fletcher's—

Q

Roy Fletcher's?

A

—and the coal house which was Mr. Workman's.

Q

Number UC"?

A

Yes.

Q

When were these built?

A

I don't know when they were built. As far as I can

guess, it would be about 1921.

It was after the first World

War, anyway.
Q

Now, the piece of property on Exhibit Number 2

which is shown as "Melvin H. Fletcher"; who owned that
property at the time these buildings on Exhibit Number 1 were
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built?
A

Ezra Workman*

Q

And who owned the parcel on Exhibit Number 2 which

is identified as Blanche Fletcher?

Who owned that at that

time?
A

Roy Fletcher, Kelvin's father.

Q

What relation was Roy Fletcher to Blanche Fletcher?

•v ; A
iw

Mel Fletcher is the son of Roy Fletcher.

Q

Who is Blanche Fletcher?

A

She was Melvin's mother.

. v ,Q

Roy's wife?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.
Gib, did you ever talk to Mr. Workman about whose

property this was where those sheds were built?
A

Oh, yes.

Q

When did this happen?

A

It happened about 1929. About the time that I built

the garage.
Q

Okay.
And who did you have the conversation with?

A
* » Q

With Ez Workman.
And was anybody else present?

A

Not that I can recall.

Q

Where were you?
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SWEENEY' LAND COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

6211

vs.
GILBERT1 and MAUD KIMBALL,
et al.,

[)\H

Defendants
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL,
Crossclaim Plaintiffs,

Vi'iTn'

:

:

Dcrmtv

7 1.033

CUM*

-Of

:

vs.
MELVIN FLETCHER, et al.,
Crossclaim Defendants.

:
:

This matter comes before the Court for clarification and
further rulings on defendants Gilbert and Maud Kimball's Motion
for Leave to Amend their Crossclaim as to co-defendants Fletchers
and proposed additional defendant Kinghorn.

The hearing was held

on December 1, 1983 at the hour of 8:15 a.m., with the Court
sitting in Salt Lake County with the agreement of counsel.
Present were Robert Felton on behalf of defendants Kimball,
0. Wood Moyle, III on behalf of proposed additional party
Gerald H. Kinghorn, and Gerald H. Kinghorn on behalf of defendants

•J ^ x
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Fletcher.

The Court on September 22, 1983 issued aTMlnutuH

denying the Kimballs1 request to amend the Crossclaim to join
Gerald Kinghorn as a party defendant.

The Memorandum did not

address the second part of the Motion asserted by defendant
Kimballs to amend their Crossclaim to assert a cause of action
for slander of title against defendant Fletchers.

Counsel argued

their respective positions, and the Court took the matter under
advisement to further consider the prior Memoranda filed, and
review certain cases and other legal authorities that may bear
upon the issue.

The Court has now had an opportunity to review

the authorities cited, and further consider the arguments of
counsel, and otherwise being fully advised, enters the following
Memorandum Decision.
The Court is of the opinion that the same reasoning
applied to the Motion to Amend their Crossclaim to name attorney
Kinghorn as a party defendant applies to the proposed Amended
Crossclaim that would assert a claim for slander of title against
co-defendants Fletcher.

The Court recognizes that the issue

before the Court is whether or not the Crossclaim should be
amended, but the matter has been argued on the merits and in view
of the nature of the ''absolute privilege11 asserted, the Court is
of the opinion and holds that the proposed Crossclaim against
Fletchers must also be denied on the basis of the absolute
privilege that attaches.

*
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The Court has reviewed carefully the case cited by counse^
Hansen vs. Cohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah, 1976) where the Supreme
Court discussed the privilege in the filing of a lis pendens.
The Court notes that the Supreme Court in that case adopted
the Restatement of Torts, Section 638 of the First Edition, now
found at Section 582 of the Restatement of Torts 2d, that a party
to private litigation has an absolute privilege to disparage
another's property.

In the Hansen vs. Cohler case, supra, the

facts of that case dealt with a lis pendens, and counsel for
Kimballs argues that the interpretation of the Court's reference
and adoption of the Restatement of Torts should be limited to a
lis pendens as opposed to a more broad interpretation which
might be read from the Restatement of Torts without a factual
situation dealing with a particular document of alleged
disparagement.
This Court is of the opinion that the Supreme Court in
Hansen vs. Cohler, supra, while dealing with a specific instance
involving a lis pendens, did not intend to restrict the principles
announced in that case by adopting the Restatement of Torts to
questions only involving lis pendens.

If in fact that was the

case, the Supreme Court in the decision could have easily so
indicated.

The fact that the Supreme Court goes on to discuss

the comments to the Restatement indicate that the Supreme Court

i'Ai
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an

absolute privilege under circumstances of private litigation
or a party allegedly disparages the property of another was to
be adopted generally, and not to be limited to the specific
fact situations involving lis pendens.
Therefore, this Court views the Restatement of Torts
dealing with this issue as to be the law of the state of Utah,
and as such the Fletchers, together with their attorney
Mr. Kinghorn, enjoy an absolute privilege under these circumstances.

Inasmuch as an absolute privilege applies, the Motion

to Amend need not and should not be allowed to assert a claim
of slander of title against the Fletchers as it was not
allowed in the Court's prior Minute Entry as to Mr. Kinghorn.
A proposed Order under cover of letter dated August 3,
1983 from Mr. Moyle to the clerk of the Court in Summit
County is therefore an appropriate Order when considered in
light of the Court's additional Memorandum Decision, with the
exception that the Court will by interlineation add following
the date of September 6, 1983, the date of December 1, 1983.
The Court has executed the proposed Order submitted by
Mr. Moyle with the one interlineation above-referenced, a copy
is enclosed for counsels' files. Accordingly, a supplemental

I Vq
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2SWEENEY LAND CO. VS.
KIMBALL, ET AL

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Order regarding the Motion for Leave to Amelia the Crossclaim
will not be necessary.
Dated this

1^

day of De

'IMTTHYvR. HANSON
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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PARTIES

Rule 2 5 ( a ) ( 2 )

will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 24(b)
except for deletion of the phrase "of the
United States" after the word " s t a t u t e "
in subd. (1).
Cross-Re ference.
Permissive joinder of parties, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 20.

Collateral References.
P a r t i e s ® ^ ? et seq.
67 C.J.S. Parties § 53 et seq.
59 Am. J u r . 2d 558, Parties § 133.
Unions: discretionary intervention in
action between union and union member,
93 A. L. R. 2d 1037.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
Compiler's Notes.
Form for motion to intervene as deRule 24(c) was amended by the Supreme
Court on J u n e 30, 1965, effective October
1, 1965. The amendment substituted "the
parties as provided in Rule 5" for "all the
parties affected thereby" at the end of
the first sentence.
This Rule is similar to the first two
sentences of Fed. Rule 24(c).
Cross-References.
Claims for relief, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 ( a ) .
Defenses; form of denials, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 8 ( b ) .

fendant, Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix Form 24.
Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21.
Motion day; determination of motions
without hearing, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 78.
Collateral References.
Parties<§=544.
67 C.J.S. Parties § 67.
59 Am. Jur. 2d 604, Parties § 172.

RULE 25
SUBSTITUTION OP PARTIES
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives
of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless the
motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death
is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the
death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or
of one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought
to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against
the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be
suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or
against the surviving parties.
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based upon that observation the defendant

a jury question. He risks an unlawful ar-

officer practically assumed that the plaintiff

rest where a misdemeanor is not committed

was the accused.

There is undoubtedly

or attempted in his presence. 1 Even where

room for difference of opinion as to wheth-

armed with a warrant he takes his chances

er the defendant's actions in so assuming

at arresting the wrong person. 2

and taking the plaintiff with him, without

conclusions seem inescapable in the light of

These

asking any further questions, and without

the clear implications of our statutes, which

making any explanation, met the requisite

govern the matter. The situation is differ-

standard of reasonable diligence and care

ent where felonies are the subject matter.

under the circumstances.

The statute protects where reason and care

It is our opinion

that the issue should have been submitted to
the jury.

are exercised. 3

Accordingly, it is necessary that

the case be remanded for that purpose.

(o \ KEY NUMIER SYSTEM>
x_ * ) n v » ^ " V v - V

Costs to plaintiff (appellant).

375 P.2d 461

WADE, C. J., and McDONOUGH and
CALLISTER, JJ., concur.

Rela Mae Spratllng PARR et al. f
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

H E N R I O D , Justice (concurring in re-

v.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK et al.,
Defendants,

sult).
I concur in the result, but do not subscribe to the main opinion's attempted differentiation between this case and Wendelboe v. Jacobson.

Edith Steadman Green and Sheldon Steadman, Intervenors and Appellants.
No. 9668.

Where misdemeanors are

the subject matter, whether the arrest is

Supreme Court of Utah.

made at night or in the daytime is of no con-

Oct. 31, 1962.

sequence. Nor does the fact that good faith,
reasonable diligence and care in identifica-

Suit was brought to quiet title to realty.

tion are exercised by the arresting officer

The intervenors intervened and claimed an

have anything to do with whether the arrest

interest in the realty as heirs of their de-

is unlawful, except by way of mitigation of

ceased father.

damages, which may be nominal or great,—

Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J.,

1. Title 77-13-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953; Title 77-12, U.C.A.1953.
2. 22 Am.Jur. 405, sec. 73, False Imprisonment.

3. Title 77-13-3(3)
C.A.1953.

The Third District Court,

and 77-13-3(5)
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rendered a summary judgment quieting title First National Bank, successor in interest
in the plaintiffs, and the intervenors ap- of the Utah Savings & Trust Company, the
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, C. J.,

administrator of the Estate of George Al-

held that the right of the intervenors to

bert Steadman, deceased, filed a disclaimer.

claim an interest in the realty as part of

The defendant, Elvina S. Steadman, the

their father's estate was barred by seven-

widow of George Albert Steadman, and the

year limitations, where more than seven

mother of the appellants, Edith Steadman

years had elapsed since the father's estate

Green and Sheldon Steadman, defaulted.

was distributed to the guardian of the in-

The appellants, Edith Steadman Green and

tervenors and before the guardian was dis-

Sheldon Steadman intervened in this action

charged.

claiming an interest in the property as the
heirs of George Albert Steadman.

Affirmed.

Their

appeal is from a summary judgment'quiet-

Limitation of Actions <&=>I74(2)
Right of intervenors in suit to quiet

ing title in respondents.

title to claim interest in realty as heirs of

The complaint alleged that respondents

their deceased father's estate was barred by

and their predecessors in interest had ac-

seven-year limitations, where more than

quired title to the property in question by

seven years had elapsed since father's es-

adverse possession for over 15 years.

tate was distributed to their guardian and

pellants' counterclaim alleged that they had

before guardian was discharged.

an interest in the property as children of

U.C.A.

1953, 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12, 78-12-21.

Ap-

George Albert Steadman, deceased, and that
seven years had not elapsed since they had

Gustin, Richards & Mattsson, Salt Lake
City, for appellants.

attained their majority.

Respondents' an-

swer to the counterclaim denied that George
Albert Steadman ever had an interest in

W. D. Beatie, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

the property in question. It further alleged
that the Statute of Limitations, Sections 78-

WADE, Chief Justice.

12-6, 78-12-8 and 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953 *

This suit was brought to quiet title to

had commenced to run against any cause of

some land situated in Salt Lake County,

action they may have had since the ap-

Utah.

pointment of the Utah Savings and Trust

The defendant in the action, Zions

I. "78-12-6. No cause of action, or deunder whose title the action is prosecuted
fense or counterclaim to an action, foundor defense or counterclaim is made, or
ed upon the title to real property or to
the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of
rents or profits out of the same, shall
such person was seized or possessed of
be effectual, unless it appears that the
the property in question within seven
person prosecuting the action, or interyears before the committing of the act
by the Howard
Library,
Reubensuch
Clarkaction
Law School,
BYU.
posing the defense Digitized
or counterclaim,
or W. HunterinLaw
respect
toJ.which
is proseMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Company as their guardian on December 11,

Appellants contend that the court erred

1942, and distribution to it on December

in not finding that under the provisions of

23, 1942, as such guardian of all the minors'

Sec. 78-12-21, 2 U.C.A.1953, which provides

interest in the property of the Estate of

that the Statute of Limitations does not

George Albert Steadman, deceased. It also

commence to run for those under the age

alleged that more than seven years had

of majority, they were not barred

passed since such distribution to the guard-

bringing this action because distribution of

ian, and before its discharge in 1957, during

the estate had been made before the right

all of which times respondents were in ad-

of action in the administrator was barred.

verse possession and paying the taxes as-

In Robbins v. Duggins, 3 this court held

sessed thereon.

from

That at no time did the

that distribution of property in an estate

guardian bring suit for the possession of

before the Statute of Limitations had run

the property or make any claim to it.

against the administrator wouid preclude

Basing its decision on the pleadings, files

the running of the Statute against minors

and records in this action, the court granted

to whom distribution had been made and

respondents' motion for summary judgment

who had no guardian to protect and pre-

on the ground that the Statute of Limita-

serve their rights.

tions had run against appellants.

this case are that a guardian was appointed

cuted or defense or counterclaim made."
"78-12-8. Whenever it appears that
the occupant, or those under whom he
claims, entered into possession of the
property under claim of title, exclusive
of other right, founding such claim upon
a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property in question, or
upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a
continued occupation and possession of
the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some
part of the property under such claim,
for seven years, the property so included
is deemed to have been [held] adversely,
except that when the property so included
consists of a tract divided into lots, the
possession of one lot is not deemed a
possession of any other lot of the same
tract."
"78-12-12. In no case shall adverse
possession be considered established under the provisions of any section of this
Code, unless it shall be shown that the

However, the facts in

land has been occupied and claimed for
the period of seven years continuously,
and that the party, his predecessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land
according to law."
2. "78-12-21. If a person entitled to commence an action for the recovery of real
property or for the recovery of the possession thereof, or to make any entry or
defense, founded on the title to real property or to rents or services out of the
same, is at the time such title shall first
descend or accrue, either: (1) Under the
age of majority; or, (2) Insane; or,
(o) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or
in execution upon conviction of a criminal
offense, for a term less than for life;
The time during which such disability
continues is not deemed any portion of
the time in this article limited for the
commencement of such actions or the
making of such entry or defense."
3. Robbins v. Duggins, 61 Utah 542, 210 P,
232.
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AMUNDSON v. MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH & ACCIDENT ASS'N
407
Cite as 13 Utah 2d 407
for appellants and distribution was made to the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
it of appellants' interest in all th4 property

A. H. Ellett, J., the plaintiff appeals.

The

which descended to them in their father's

Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that

estate. This guardian had possession or the

under policy requiring notice and proof of

right to possession of their property for

loss to be given as soon as "reasonably pos-

more than the required seven years.

In

sible" proof of loss should have been filed

Dignan v. Nelson,

4

this court held that

within six years after the loss and where it

where the Statute of Limitations has run

was not filed until after a lapse of 32 years

against a guardian, the minor heirs are like-

recovery on the policy was barred.

wise barred, just as we have held that

Judgment affirmed.

when, the administrator was barred, the minor heirs of decedent 6 were barred, and
for the same reasons.
Affirmed.

1. Insurance <S=>539(I)
Under a health and accident policy re-

Costs to respondents.

quiring notice and proof of loss as soon as
"reasonably possible", a beneficiary's de-

HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLISTER, and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

mand based upon ignorance of the policy
must be made within the reasonable time
for insurer to investigate the claim and be-

2>

KEY NUHBf • SYSTIH,

fore its staleness poses a substantial obstacle to ascertaining the facts surrounding

375 P.2d 463
Valera AMUNDSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
M U T U A L B E N E F I T H E A L T H AND ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 9588.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 5, 1962.
Action to recover on a health and acci-

the occurrence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Insurance <§=>539(6)
Under a health and accident policy requiring notice and proof of loss to be given
as soon as "reasonably possible" and the
statute barring claims based upon written
contracts after six years has elapsed, proof
of loss should have been filed within six

From an order granting de-

years after the loss, and where it was not

fendant's motion for summary judgment in

filed until after a lapse of 32 years recovery

dent policy.

4. Dignan et al. v. Nelson et JBLI., 26 Utah
186, 72 P. 936.

5. Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah 108, 66 P.
773.
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